Angry Birds Flock Together: Aggression Propagation on Social Media by Terizi, Chrysoula et al.
Angry Birds Flock Together:
Aggression Propagation on Social Media
Chrysoula Terizi1, Despoina Chatzakou2, Evaggelia Pitoura1, Panayiotis Tsaparas1, Nicolas
Kourtellis3
1University of Ioannina, Greece, 2Centre for Research and Technology Hellas, Greece, 3Telefonica Research, Spain
chterizi@cs.uoi.gr,dchatzakou@iti.gr,pitoura@cs.uoi.gr,tsap@cs.uoi.gr,nicolas.kourtellis@telefonica.com
ABSTRACT
Cyberaggression has been found in various contexts and online so-
cial platforms, and modeled on different data using state-of-the-art
machine and deep learning algorithms to enable automatic detec-
tion and blocking of this behavior. Users can be influenced to act
aggressively or even bully others because of elevated toxicity and
aggression in their own (online) social circle. In effect, this behavior
can propagate from one user and neighborhood to another, and
therefore, spread in the network. Interestingly, to our knowledge,
no work has modeled the network dynamics of aggressive behavior.
In this paper, we take a first step towards this direction, by study-
ing propagation of aggression on social media. We look into vari-
ous opinion dynamics models widely used to model how opinions
propagate through a network. We propose ways to enhance these
classical models to accommodate how aggression may propagate
from one user to another, depending on how each user is connected
to other aggressive or regular users. Through extensive simulations
on Twitter data, we study how aggressive behavior could propagate
in the network. We validate the models with ground truth crawled
and annotated data, reaching up to 80%AUC . We discuss the results
and implications of our work.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online aggression has spiked in the last few years, with many re-
ports of such behavior across different contexts [15, 43]. Indeed,
cyberaggression can potentially manifest in any type of platform, re-
gardless of the target audience and utility or purpose envisioned for
the platform. In fact, such behavior has been observed in different
online social media platforms such as Twitter [9, 10], Instagram [36],
YouTube [11], Yahoo Finance [21], Yahoo Answers [38], 4chan [35],
and across various demographics (e.g., teenagers vs. adults, men
vs. women, etc. [7, 15, 50]). Interestingly, it is difficult to find a
generally accepted definition of cyberaggression across disciplines.
As argued in [14], there are different ways to define online aggres-
sion, depending on frequency or severity of the behavior, power
difference of the victim with aggressor, etc.
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As it has been found in [34], users can be influenced to act ag-
gressively and even bully others because of elevated toxicity and
aggression in their own social circle. This behavior canmanifest in a
similar fashion in the online world as well, and aggression can prop-
agate from one user and neighborhood to another, thus, spreading
in the network. In fact, some early studies in sociology and psychol-
ogy already proposed models of computer abuse based on theories
of social learning, social bonds, and planned behavior [41].
Indeed, some early work [52] has studied the pairwise inter-
actions between users and how bullies can influence others, in a
online social network. However, to our knowledge, no work has
modeled the network dynamics of aggressive behavior using formal
propagation or diffusion models, and study how users’ online neigh-
bors and whole social circles affect the propagation of aggression
through the network in time. This paper takes the first, but crucial,
steps to investigate pending fundamental questions such as: How
can aggressive behavior propagate from one user or neighborhood in
the network to another? What propagation model and parameters
could best represent the aggression diffusion and its intensity?
There are several formal models in literature to study propaga-
tion of information through a network, such as opinion dynam-
ics [49], Linear Threshold (LT) and Independent Cascades (IC) [39].
Given their suitability for behavior modeling, in this paper, we focus
on opinion dynamics, widely used to model how opinions prop-
agate through a network, and leave LT and IC models for future
work. We propose new methods for modeling aggression propaga-
tion, by modifying classical opinion models to accommodate how
aggression may propagate from one user to another.
Indeed, aggression can manifest in a network in various ways:
one-time harassment by single (or multiple) contact(s), repetitive
bullying behavior by single (or multiple) contact(s), etc. To make
the problem tractable, we study aggression propagation in its mini-
mal form of one-time aggressive behavior exhibited from one user
to another. If this behavior repeats between the same users, the
aggression effect is stronger and cumulative (i.e., bullying [9, 10]).
Thus, we opt for models that consider important factors such as
how much the 2nd user is exposed to aggressive behavior of the 1st
user or its neighborhood, popularity of interacting users, internal
user state, etc. We validate the models’ performance on real Twitter
data to measure their ability to model this behavior through time.
The contributions of this work are the following:
• We formally present the problem of aggression propagation
in a social network, and the necessary assumptions to study
it in an algorithmic fashion on a network of users.
• We propose new network algorithms to model aggression
propagation: they are based on opinion dynamics methods
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but informed by properties of aggression found in literature
on psychology, sociology, and computational social science.
• We implement these methods into a framework that simu-
lates aggression propagation in a network, while controlling
for various experimental factors such as: 1) social network
used, 2) propagation model applied, 3) selection and ordering
of users or edges affected by the propagation. This frame-
work can be applied in different social networks, given ap-
propriate data to bootstrap the models.
• We present extensive experimentation with the simulating
framework and Twitter data, and show how model perfor-
mance depends on the various factors controlled. We find
that methods which consider direct interactions between
users and users’ internal aggression state, better model ag-
gression and how it could evolve on Twitter. We validate the
top-performing methods with a case study on Twitter data
and show up to AUC=80% on predicting which users will
be aggressive or not in the future. We discuss implications
of our findings for curbing cyberaggression on Twitter and
other networks with similar structure.
• We open-source our simulation framework and data for re-
producibility and extensibility purposes.
2 MODELING OPINION PROPAGATION
In social networks, users may interact with others in their immedi-
ate ego-network on a given topic, and consequently may adapt their
opinion, or even adopt their friends’ personal opinion altogether.
Opinion formation is a complex process and many researchers have
studied it under different settings. Thus, several mathematical mod-
els have been proposed to simulate the propagation of opinion in
a network (for a review see [49]). In this section, we first cover
background concepts around opinion propagation, and then basic
methods proposed to model opinion dynamics.
2.1 General Problem of Opinion Modeling
Background. Numerous studies have been conducted around the
opinion spreading [51]. Most published opinion models simulate
how an individual’s opinion could evolve from the influence he
could receive from his immediately environment. In [45], a simple
stochastic model (Voter model) was presented, where an individual
is absolutely vulnerable to his neighbor’s opinion, which he assim-
ilates if he interacts with. In this class of binary-state dynamics
models belongs the Sznajd model [53] which states that “if two
people share the same opinion, their neighbors will start to agree
with them (social validation), and if a block of adjacent persons dis-
agree, their neighbors start to argue with them (discord destroys)”.
In [18], a model of opinion dynamics showed that agents adjust
continuous opinions on the occasion of random binary encounters
whenever their difference in opinion is below a given threshold. A
classical model of consensus formation was presented in [33], the
variant of this model due to [27], a time dependent version and a
nonlinear version with bounded confidence of the agents. There are
also models that combine and compare the aforementioned basic
models [4, 5, 24, 42]. Also, a few studies have been published that
verify the opinion prediction in real setting [51]. For example, real
data were used by [4], psychological data in [17], and information
from Italian and German elections in [5, 8, 25].
Problem Definition. The opinion propagation problem can be
formally presented as follows [30, 37, 53]. There is a population of
M individuals connected in a network over weighted edges. This
weight can signify the intensity of interaction or closeness between
two individuals. Each user, at time t has its initial interior opinion
oi on a topic. After an interaction between two users i and j who
are neighboring in the network, each of the individuals is led to a
new state on the topic.
In general, the interaction between users during the opinion
propagation can be assumed to happen in a pairwise or group
fashion. In effect, one user may be influenced by another user, or
multiple users in his neighborhood. In pairwise models, there are
two connected individuals, i and j, and each one can have their
personal opinion on a topic. User i’s opinion can only be affected
by the influence of user j’s opinion that he is connected. In group
fashion models, there is user i and his neighborhood Ni of users
with opinions which can influence i’s opinion. Next, we characterize
each model based on this distinction and its fundamentals.
Overall, this kind of procedure can be considered as a mechanism
of making a decision in a closed community. The general problem
of opinion modeling presents a plurality of models that differentiate
the final state of the individual and the manner in which it is formed.
For easiness, we use the following general notations in the text:
oti The opinion value for user i at moment t
wi j The weight of edge
(
i, j
)
, between users i and j
Ni The set of friends (neighborhood) of user i
2.2 Classical Opinion Propagation Models
VoterModel.One of the simplest and well-known pairwise models
in opinion dynamics is the Voter model [13]. In this model, there
are only two discrete opinion types:
{
0, +1
}
. At each time step,
an edge
(
i, j
)
is selected from the network, and user i adopts the
opinion that his neighbor j had in the previous time step:
ot+1i = o
t
j (1)
For undirected networks, the model reaches consensus to one of
the possible initial opinions. For directed networks, the model was
modified [56] to one that fixes the users’ out-degree that induce
early fragmentation.
Deffuant Model. Another pairwise model suited for interaction
within large populations is the Deffuant model [18] that captures
confirmation bias, i.e., people’s tendency to accept opinions that
agree with their own. In this model, users adjust continuous opin-
ions from their initial binary opinion whenever their difference
in opinion is below a given threshold. At each time step, an edge
between users
(
i, j
)
is selected and user i takes into account the
opinion of its neighbor j when the absolute value of their opinions’
difference is less than a specific selected value d :
If |oti − otj | < d, then (2)
ot+1i = o
t
i + µ
(
otj - o
t
i
)
and ot+1j = o
t
j + µ
(
oti - o
t
j
)
where, µ is the convergence parameter, with µ ∈ [0, 0.5]. High
threshold values lead to convergence of opinions whereas low val-
ues lead in several opinion clusters.
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DeGroot Model. Another model in literature that allows a user
to consider all or some of their neighbors’ score, is the DeGroot
model [19]. Here, there is an undirected network and at time t ,
all users change their opinion by taking the average of their own
opinion and the opinion of their neighbors. After a number of
iterations (i.e., opinion changes or time steps), the network reaches
consensus and each user will have the same opinion.
ot+1i =
wiio
t
i +
∑
j ∈Ni wi jotj
wii +
∑
j ∈Ni wi j
(3)
FJModel.A variation of the DeGroot model was proposed by Fried-
kin and Johnsen [27]. The main difference between the two models
is that in the FJ model each user has an intrinsic initial opinion that
remains the same, and an expressed opinion that changes over time.
User i’s new opinion is estimated as:
ot+1i =
wiio
0
i +
∑
j ∈Ni wi jotj
wii +
∑
j ∈Ni wi j
(4)
The network consensus is not reached every time, but only in
specific cases. Also, the calculation of the opinion’s convergence can
be modeled as a randomwalk in the graph, and if an absorbent node
is attached in a node, it maintains the node’s opinion stable [29].
HKModel. In [33], opinions take values in a continuous interval,
where a bounded confidence limits the interaction of user i holding
opinion oi to neighbors with opinions in [oi -ε , oi+ε], where ε ∈
[0, 1] is the uncertainty. Also, a user interacts with all of his friends:
ot+1i =
wiio
t
i +
∑
j ∈Ni :
oti −otj <ε wi jotj
wii +
∑
j ∈Ni :
oti −otj <ε wi j (5)
The model was proven to converge in polynomial time and leads
to consensus when ε > εc and each user or group of users are
polarized when ε < εc .
3 MODELING AGGRESSION PROPAGATION
Previously, we outlined some of the most classical models for opin-
ion propagation in a network. Here, we build on these methods
to model how aggression could propagate in the network, as an
opinion would. Next, we discuss insights extracted from literature
that attempt to model aggression in different ways. Building on
this background, we formally propose the Aggression Propagation
problem, in a way that can be aligned with opinion propagation.
Finally, we present how the literature insights can be used to inform
existing opinion models into modeling aggression propagation.
3.1 Aggression Modeling: Literature Insights
Aggression has been well studied in the past, in online and offline
contexts, from sociologists and psychologists [1, 3, 14, 23, 48, 50,
55] and computational social or computer scientists in different
forms: cyberbullying and aggression on Twitter and other media [9,
10, 20, 26, 31], hateful speech [16, 54], and offensive or abusive
language [11, 41, 46].
1. Influence from strong social relationships. Aggressive be-
havior is reactionary and impulsive, and often results in breaking
household rules or the law, and can even be violent and unpre-
dictable [22]. Interestingly, aggressive acts, while reflecting the in-
fluence of various mental and physical disorders, in most instances
represent learned behaviors from other individuals [28]. In fact,
some earlier works proposed that online abusive behavior could
be explained using sociology- and psychology-based theories such
as social learning, social bonds and planned behavior [41]. Further-
more, [12] observed that a person’s negative mood increases the
likelihood of adopting negative behavior, which is easily transmit-
ted from person to person. In addition, [52] identified that bullies
may be able to exert influence through their pairwise interactions
with others in the network, and thus spread bullying. These works
lead us to the first insight on aggressive behavior: due to strong
social bonds, users can be influenced by, and learn from others such
aggressive behavior.
2. Influence from social groups. Aggressive adolescents may be
unpopular in the larger social community of peers and adults, yet
they can be accepted by and closely linked to particular subgroups
of peers [6]. Furthermore, as it was investigated in [2], the personal
responsibility exhibited by individuals or groups can be captured by
the General Aggression Model (GAM) [1]. The authors established
that when individuals or a group of individuals come to believe
either that they are not responsible or that they will not be held
accountable by others, the stage is set for the occurrence of violent
evil and aggressiveness [2]. In addition, in recent studies on Twitter
by Chatzakou et al. [9, 10], cyberbully and aggressive users were
found to be less embedded in the network, with fewer friends and
smaller clustering coefficient. Further, [40] found that exposing a
person to negative or positive behaviors of those around him, leads
him to experience the same emotions as them. These results lead
us to the second insight: aggressive users may be embedded in small
social groups, which can have high impact on their aggression.
3. Influence due to power difference. Studies have also looked
at the emotional and behavioral state of victims of bullying and
aggression and how it connects to the aggressor’s or victim’s net-
work status. In [14] it was observed that a high power difference in
network status of the two individuals can be a significant property
of bully-victim relationship. The authors in [48] noted that the
emotional state of a victim depends on the power of the victim’s
bullies. For example, more negative emotional experiences were
observed when more popular cyberbullies conducted the attack.
Also, users with higher degree centrality are not only more popular,
but potentially more influential on others, since their position in
the network offers them greater exposure and consequently greater
opportunity to have an impact on the behavior of other users [52].
These observations lead us to the third insight: the power difference
that a user may have over another (e.g., due to popularity) can be a
decisive factor on the exerted aggression.
4. Influence due to internal state and external input. GAM
is an integrative approach to understanding aggression that in-
corporates the best aspects of many domain-specific theories of
aggression and takes into account a wide range of factors that af-
fect aggression. It is separated into two layers, representing the
distal causes and proximate causes. The distal processes express
how biological (e.g., hormone imbalances, low serotonin, and testos-
terone) and persistent environmental (e.g., difficult life conditions,
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victimization, and diffusion of responsibility) factors work together
to influence a user’s personality and increase the likelihood of de-
veloping an aggressive personality. The proximate processes have
three stages: (i) inputs, (ii) routes, and (iii) outcomes, that can affect
the person’s level of aggression and possible reactions to the input.
The reaction that is selected then influences the encounter, which
in turn influences the person and situation factors, beginning a
new cycle of influence. The findings from this important study lead
us to a forth insight: users can be influenced by external inputs, but
they also try to consolidate them with their internal state of arousal,
cognition and affect, before moving to a new state.
5. Influence can appear in cycles. The overall process outlined
by the GAM, and the previously extracted insights (1-4) can be cap-
tured in an aggression propagation model. The user (who could be
an aggressor or a victim/normal user) is allowed under monitoring
to: (1) have an internal aggression state of his own, (2) interact with
his neighbors and close friends and receive and/or exert influence
of aggression, (3) assess if he will be changing his stance on aggres-
sion, i.e., to become more (or less) aggressive after his interactions,
(4) act by changing (or not) his stance, (5) repeat these steps in the
next cycle (or time step). This insight allows to build on adapted
opinion models that work in simulated rounds or cycles to solve
the Aggression Propagation problem, as presented next.
3.2 Aggression Propagation Problem
Online users may be “friends” and connected in an online social
network. In our setup, user i , at time t has its own aggression score
that represents his internal, continuous state, Sti . While he interacts
with his followers or followings, he may be influenced to be more
or less aggressive, thus changing his internal aggression state at
every time instance. The impact that others (i.e., his direct friends or
neighborhood) have on his aggression state, can be a function of the
strong social relationships with him (wi j ), his power score Pi (e.g.,
degree centrality), the size of the user’s neighborhood (Ni ), etc. The
change of aggression state is continuous, i.e., at every time instance,
users are influencing each other’s aggression state, partially or to-
tally. Therefore, the problem of aggression propagation is to model
how aggression among users will diffuse or propagate in a net-
work for some time windowW . Obviously, this problem has clear
similarities with the opinion propagation problem, and techniques
to model opinion dynamics presented earlier could be adapted to
model how users influence each other to change aggression state.
As this is the first investigation on this problem, we opt to es-
tablish a solid baseline of solutions to the problem at hand, and
propose simple, parameter-free models that are generalizable and
applicable to different social networks. Since aggression can man-
ifest in different ways and intensities, in this work, we study its
propagation in a minimal form of one-time aggressive behavior
exhibited from one user to another. Repetition, or accumulation of
aggressive behavior (via multiple same-pair interactions) can lead
to bullying [9, 10]. Interestingly, this extreme behavior can also be
captured in our models with repetitive increase of aggression state.
The following lists the additional notations used in text:
Sti Aggression score of user i , at time t , S
t
i ∈[0, 1]
wi j Weight of edge
(
i, j
)
of users i and j, defined as
Jaccard overlap of neighbor sets: Ni∩NjNi∪Nj ∈[0, 1]
Pi Power score of user i: ratio of in-degree over
out-degree: inDeдr eeioutDeдr eei ∈ [0, 1]
Ax Selector for applying a factor out of the options:
1,wi j , Pi , Pj ,wi jPi andwi jPj , for user x
Next, we take the five insights identified and embed them in the
mentioned opinion models, to construct our proposals for modeling
aggression propagation through the network.
Voter & Deffuant models & variants. Firstly, we propose four
pairwise models based on the Voter model. We assume that after
an interaction between two users i and j, the aggression score of i
changes, because he was influenced (positively or negatively). The
formulation of the first set of proposed models is the following:
St+1i = AjS
t
j (6)
The model names depend on factor Ax : Voter, Voter_W, Voter_P
and Voter_WP.
These models take into account the strong relationship (1st in-
sight) between user i and j. User i’s aggression score does not
consider its own state but only the aggression score of the neighbor
j. The four versions reflect different variations of the Voter model,
where the user i assumes the aggression of his neighbor: 1) all of
it (i.e., the neighbor is completely affecting the user), 2) weighted
by their edge weight (i.e., the neighbor has an influence but only
depending on the strength of their relationship), 3) weighted by the
Power score of the neighbor (i.e., to capture the concept of power
difference that aggressors take advantage of), and 4) weighted by
the combination of Power and edge weight.
Based on Voter and Deffuant models, we propose a 2nd set of
models, where user i at t + 1 does not only take into account the
aggression state of his neighbor j (1st insight), but also includes his
personal state before making changes in his aggression (4th insight).
Consequently, this set of models can be formalized as follows:
St+1i = AiS
t
i +AjS
t
j (7)
The model names depend on factor Ax : Deffuant_W, Deffuant_P
and Deffuant_WP. If factor Ax is equal to 1, it is not taken into
account. To maintain the limits of aggression score in a closed
interval [0, 1], we normalize the final aggression score of user i
using the maximum aggression score from all the neighbors of i at
time t + 1.
Deffuant &HKmodels & variants.Another set of pairwise mod-
els we propose combine the Deffuant and HK models, as follows:
If |AiSti −AjStj | < d, then, St+1i = AiSti +AjStj (8)
The model names depend on factor Ax : HK_d_W, HK_d_P and
HK_d_WP. It does not include the case of factor Ax equal to 1.
This set of pairwise models uses the condition about the bounded
confidence limits from the HK model (3rd insight), and updates the
aggression score accordingly. The proposed model is affected by
the strong relationship with its neighbor (1st insight) and internal
personal state (4th insight) at the previous moment. We normalize
the final aggression score using the maximum aggression score
from all of i’s neighbors, for those that the treaty is valid at t + 1.
DeGroot model & variants. The next set of proposed models
take into account the neighborhood of user i for deciding what
aggression score to give to the user (2nd insight). The aggression of
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a user can be influenced by all of user’s neighbors and its internal
behavior (4th insight). As a result, this set of models are variants
of DeGroot model which considers an average effect across all the
neighborhood of the user, and are calculated as follows:
St+1i =
AiS
t
i +
∑
j ∈Ni AjStj
Ai +
∑
j ∈Ni Aj
(9)
The model names depend on factor Ax : Degroot, DeGroot_W, De-
Groot_P and DeGroot_WP. Ax = 1 corresponds to the original
DeGroot model.
FJ model & variants.We also propose variants of the FJ model, in-
tegrating the initial aggression state of an individual in the network
(4th insight), along with the user’s neighborhood (2nd insight):
St+1i =
AiS
0
i +AiS
t
i +
∑
j ∈Ni AjStj
2Ai +
∑
j ∈Ni Aj
(10)
The model names depend on factor Ax : FJ_W, FJ_P, FJ_WP.
Averaging DeGroot & FJ models & variants. We propose the
following set of models based on DeGroot and FJ, where the ag-
gression score of each user has been inspired by the 2nd, 3rd and
4th insights. The models are modified by taking the average power
score and aggression score from all of user’s neighbors, individually:
St+1i =
(Ai +∑j ∈Ni Aj
1 +
∑
j ∈Ni 1
) (Sti +∑j ∈Ni Stj
1 +
∑
j ∈Ni 1
)
(11)
The model names depend on factor Ax : avg DeGroot_W, avg DeG-
root_P, and avg DeGroot_WP.
The final set of proposed models is similar to FJ models, but in
these we consider the initial aggressive state of each user i (2nd-4th
insights). Thus, the models are as follows:
St+1i =
(Ai +Ai +∑j ∈Ni Aj
1 + 1 +
∑
j ∈Ni 1
) (S0i + Sti +∑j ∈Ni Stj
1 + 1 +
∑
j ∈Ni 1
)
(12)
The model names depend on factor Ax : avg FJ_W, avg FJ_P, and
avg FJ_WP.
Next, we explain how all presented models are implemented into
a simulator for exhaustive experimentationwith different parameter
settings using real Twitter data.
4 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we outline the methodology followed to simulate
propagation of aggression in a social network, given each one of
the models proposed earlier. First, some users in the network are
assumed to be aggressive, and the rest as normal, formalizing the
network’s initial state. As time passes, users interact with, and may
affect, each other to become more or less aggressive, thus chang-
ing the overall state of aggression of the network through time.
Different models can be used to describe these user interactions,
and aggression change. To identify which model is better for this
task, we compare each model’s imposed aggression changes with
real (ground truth) data of aggression propagation. Each model
performs differently through the simulation, and may match best
with the ground truth data at different point in the simulated time.
Therefore, at regular time intervals during each simulation we cap-
ture snapshots of the network’s aggression state and compare each
model with the validation data.
Next, we address in the simulator design important factors that
can impact the exploration of this complex problem:
1. Online social network & Ground truth data
2. Aggressive and normal users
3. Users (edges) to perform propagation
4. Ordering of users to perform propagation
5. Propagation models applied to modify users’ scores
6. Metrics used to capture (change of) state of aggression
7. Metrics to compare state of aggression in simulated and
validation networks
4.1 Online social network & ground truth data
For our experimental exploration, two main datasets are considered,
as presented in Table 1. Firstly, a Labeled Twitter (LT ) network
was constructed using 401 annotated users from [9] as seeds for
crawling their ego-network, to record their friends and followers.
This set of data constitutes our ground truth, as explained next. We
performed two crawls of these 401 users’ ego networks: in 2016
and in 04-05/2019. These 401 users were originally annotated in
2016 as normal, aggressive, bullying, or spammers. We removed the
spam class and merged all aggressive and bullying users under
the aggressive label. Thus, the 401 users have two labels for 2016.
However, we do not have the state of the friends and followers for
2016, so we make the conservative assumption that in 2016 they
were normal, apart from the 401 seed users.
When the re-crawl in 2019 was completed, ∼650k users were
found to be active, ∼30k users were found suspended, ∼37k users
had deleted their account; for ∼452k users the status was not re-
trievable. We make the assumption that active and deleted users in
2019 can be considered normal, and suspended users are aggressive.
We justify this assumption with the following reasoning. The au-
thors in [10] classified users as aggressive or normal based on their
activity, account and network characteristics, with high confidence
based on crowdsourced annotations. When they examined the ac-
count status of these 401 users after regular time periods (in 2017
and 2018), many of the aggressive users were suspended by Twitter,
thus justifying their original annotation.1 Therefore, the character-
ization of the re-crawled users as aggressive or normal based on
their account status can be considered realistic. To this end, the
overall Crawled Network LT has 1, 171, 218 users (including the
401 seeds) and 1, 787, 543 edges connecting them. However, 477, 113
edges were dropped, since their endpoints’ status was not retriev-
able. In both crawls of 2016 and 2019 for this network, these users
are labeled as normal or aggressive, following the above process.
Secondly, an Unlabeled Twitter (UT ) network was consid-
ered, with 81, 306 users, and 1, 768, 149 directed edges between
them, acquired from [44]. We specifically focus on the network’s
Strongly Connected Component (SCC) and the final UT network
has 68, 413 users and 1, 685, 163 edges. Also, and following past
work on network analysis [57], we apply weights on the edges
based on the Jaccard overlap of social circles between two users i
and j,wi j =
Ni∩Nj
Ni∪Nj ∈ [0, 1]. As explained next, we apply a classifi-
cation process to characterize these unlabeled users of this dataset
as either aggressive or normal, using the 401 labeled users from LT .
1Twitter suspends an account (temporarily or even permanently, in some cases) if it
has been hijacked/compromised, is considered spam/fake, or if it is abusive.
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Table 1: Overview of datasets used with our framework.
Ground truth labeled data (LT) Unlabeled data (UT)
Crawled Net Ego-Ego Net (SCC) Full Net SCC
# nodes 1,171,218 314 (57) 81,306 68,413
# edges 1,787,543 540 (395) 1,768,149 1,685,163
labels AggressiveNormal
Bullying
Aggressive
Normal
→ AggressiveNormal
Aggressive
Normal
4.2 Which users should be aggressive?
In the Unlabeled Full Network (UT ), we have no labels of ag-
gression, and thus, we do not know which users exhibit aggression
and which are normal. To this end, in order to identify users who
should be labeled as aggressive, we proceed as follows:
(1) We use the ego-network data of the 401 users from LT , to
train a classifier (CL) on users’ network features,2 and thus
to infer the likelihood that a user will be aggressive. CL was
a Random Forest classifier, where we tuned the number of
trees to be generated as 10, and the maximum depth set as
unlimited. Overall, we achieved 93.24% accuracy and 93.2%
precision and recall.
(2) We extract the same network properties from the UT net-
work, and apply on it the CL, in order to label its users as
aggressive or not, based on some threshold.
By applying CL on the UT network, we got 8.5% or 5, 820 users
who were labeled as aggressive. We verified that users selected
to be aggressive (or normal) in UT had similar distributions for
their network properties with the 401 annotated users in LT . Each
aggressive (normal) user i was given a score Si = 1 (Si = 0). Inter-
acting users can modify each other’s aggression state, leading to
users with scores between 0 and 1.
4.3 Users to perform propagation
We select a set R of random users for executing the propagation
model. A large R can cover a larger portion of the network, but can
be extremely costly to simulate. We opt for 10% of random edges,
covering 65.3% of total users of theUT network.
4.4 Propagation changes applied
Users in R selected for propagation may interact with each other
in different ways:
(1) Randomly, i.e., the selected users are randomly shuffled be-
fore their aggression is propagated.
(2) Based on the most popular (or least popular) user (e.g., using
their degree centrality).
(3) Based on the neighborhood involved (i.e., group users based
on neighborhood and propagate between them).
(4) Based on their network id (a proxy of their account age, a
trend confirmed in our data).
We measure how each method impacts the aggression change of
each model during simulation.
2User’s friends and followers, their ratio, user’s clustering coefficient score, hub score,
authority score, and eigenvector score.
Table 2: Metrics used to measure aggression change.
Metric of state at time t=i Explanation
{n}i portion of normal users in the network
{a}i portion of aggressive users in the net-
work
{N-N}i portion of edges that both users i and
j are normal
{N-A}i portion of edges that user i is normal
& j aggressive
{A-N}i portion of edges that user i is aggres-
sive & j normal
{A-A}i portion of edges that i and j are ag-
gressive users
State change between t=i and t=j Explanation
{n}i → {n | | a}j portion of normal users in the initial
state who remain normal or become
aggressive, respectively
{a}i → {n | | a}j portion of aggressive users in the ini-
tial state who become normal or re-
main aggressive, respectively
{N-N}i → {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}j portion of edges that users i and j at
initial state were normal and remain
normal, or one, or both users become
aggressive, respectively
{N-A}i → {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}j same as above for edges where j is
aggressive at the initial state
{A-N}i → {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}j same as above for edges where i is
aggressive at the initial state
{A-A}i → {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}j same as above for edges where both i
and j are aggressive at the initial state
4.5 Propagation models used
We test all models explained earlier. They are parameter-less, mak-
ing them simple and generalizable on different networks and setups.
4.6 Metrics used to measure aggression change
We measure the state of aggression of users and network, and
how it changes through simulated time using 26 different metrics,
as explained in Table 2. These elements capture the state of the
network with respect to users and edges and their label at time
t = i , and how they changed through the simulation between time
ti and tj (declared as→). Each of these metrics can be computed at
regular snapshots (T0, T1, T2, . . . , TN ), by comparing the network
state at a given snapshot (TN ) with initial state T0.
4.7 Measuring ground truth metrics
In the previous paragraphs, we described the list of metrics we mea-
sure to quantify the changes in state of aggression in the network.
We compute these metrics in the LT network using the previously
mentioned time crawls (2016 and 2019). Thus, we construct a ground
truth or validation vector for the above mentioned 26 metrics (Ta-
ble 2), which capture the change of aggression of users and type of
edges (A-A, A-N, etc.). However, we do not take into account the
following four metrics: n, n→ n, N-N, and N-N→ N-N, as they
are dominant and overtake the rest of changes.
4.8 Comparing simulation & ground truth data
The above set of metrics is computed for all models and for 10 time
snapshots per simulation. Using a pre-selected threshold TA for
each user’s aggression score, we binarize their final state and thus,
compute overall aggression change in nodes and edges. Then, we
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compare with the validation vector from the ground truth data. This
comparison is executed using standard similarity metrics such as
Cosine similarity, Pearson correlation, Spearman rank correlation,
and Euclidean distance. This comparison establishes how close a
model changes the state of aggression of the network (in both nodes
and edges) to match the ground truth.
5 ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we show the results from the extensive simulations
performed, under different experimental settings used: 26 propa-
gation models, 10 thresholds for TA = 0.05, . . . , 0.9, comparisons
with 10 time snapshots, 4 metrics for comparing ground truth with
model performance in each snapshot, 5 types of orderings of users
to propagate aggression, and 10% random edges (and their users).
5.1 Which models are stable and perform best?
The first step towards analyzing the simulation results is to compare
the proposed models with respect to their performance. Cosine
similarity is used for the comparison, with the threshold above
which a user is characterized as aggressive or not, set to TA = 0.5.
Figure 1 plots the cosine similarity for all considered models in
relation to the validation vector of real data. We observe that with
Deffuant_P, we achieve best performance. Also, Voter , Deffuant_W,
and HK_*_W are among the top models.
We note that when the edge weight (W ) is considered, the per-
formance in some cases is adversely affected. For example, the
Voter_W model reaches similarity with ground truth less than 0.5.
Mixed results are observed when the Power score (P ) is used; e.g.,
in Deffuant and DeGroot models the performance increases, indicat-
ing that the influence of user j to its neighbor i is more important
when it is not constrained to the given edge (i, j), but instead, when
the neighborhood of i , Ni , is considered. Degroot and F J models
perform similarly, indicating that the state of neighborhood of the
user has no significant influence to the overall performance. Finally,
averaging DeGroot and F J models perform the worst, regardless of
whether the edge weight or power score are considered, separately
or in combination.
Different Aggression Thresholds TA. We evaluate further the
proposed models by investigating a wider range of thresholds
TA = 0.05, . . . , 0.9 (results omitted due to space limits). Overall, we
observe models showing stable (low or high) performance, indepen-
dent of TA selected, or models highly depended on TA. Specifically,
Deffuant_P, Voter, and HK_*_P achieve high performance (similar-
ity > 0.8). On the contrary, Voter_W, Voter_WP, and Averaging_*_*
show lower performance (similarity < 0.7) regardless ofTA selected.
Alternatively, there are models whose performance highly depends
on the change ofTA.Deffuant_W* andHK_*_W* fluctuate from aver-
age to high performance (0.7 < similarity < 0.85), and Degroot* and
FJ_* show highly varying performance (0.45 < similarity < 0.85).
Takeaways. From the top performing models, i.e., Deffuant_P,
Voter, and HK_*_P, two main observations can be made: (i) a user’s
internal aggression state is highly dependent on their mate’s aggres-
sion state (i.e., withwhom there is a direct interaction / relationship),
and (ii) the internal aggression state of a user constitutes an impor-
tant factor in aggression propagation. This observation aligns well
with the 4th insight in Sec. 3.1. In situations with various options
Figure 1: Cosine similarity of all proposed models with the valida-
tion vector, for 10% of selected edges and TA = 0.5. The different
time snapshots of the simulation are colored from light to dark blue.
We group the models in sets based on their commonality.
for reaction, the inner state (in our case, the aggression state) of
individuals, as well as those with whom there is a direct connec-
tion with, are key factors in the subsequent state of the individuals
themselves [32]. This is also reflected by the top models, as, on the
one hand, they are all pairwise models, while on the other, apart
from Voter , they consider a user’s internal aggression state before
making aggression changes. Overall, based on the best models, we
observe that online aggression (especially when taking place on
Twitter) is propagating from one user to another; users are not
so influenced by their neighborhood. Aggressive users have been
shown to be less popular (i.e., smaller number of followers and
friends) than normal users [10] which could explain the fact that
aggressive users are more affected by direct relationships rather
than their neighborhood aggression state.
5.2 How do models perform over time?
Next, we examine how model performance is affected when differ-
ent time snapshots of the network’s aggression state are considered.
This analysis is done to: (i) compare with ground truth each model’s
state at progressing simulation times, and (ii) detect which of the
snapshots was better fitting the real data. We remind the reader
that there is no point in simulating propagation until the models
converge to some steady state, since the time taken for this may
not match the timing the ground truth data were captured. For our
analysis, we focus on the top four performing (regardless of TA)
models, i.e., Deffuant_P, Voter, HK_0.5_P, and HK_1.0_P.
Figure 2 shows that for all models, performance is lower within
the first snapshots and gradually increases, to stabilize in the last
snapshots. As for the similaritymetrics, they follow a similar pattern
across models, indicating that either of them can be used to do the
performance analysis, and that the comparison results are stable
against analysis that considers ranks or absolute numbers in the
vectors compared.
Takeaways. These models successfully capture how a network’s
aggression status changes across time. The notion of snapshots con-
stitutes a valid process in representing the aggression propagation,
since it captures the way aggression is (or will be) expected to be
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(a) Voter (b) Deffuant_P (c) HK_0.5_P (d) HK_1.0_P
Figure 2: Similarity of the top 4 performing models with ground truth, through 10 time snapshots: (a) Voter, (b) Deffuant_P, (c) HK_0.5_P, and
(d) HK_1.0_P. We show 4 similarity metrics: cosine similarity, Pearson correlation, spearman correlation, and euclidean distance. Variation of
colors for a metric illustrate the performance of the given model and metric for different thresholds TA = 0.05, . . . , 0.90.
(a) Deffuant_P (b) HK_0.5_P
Figure 3: Final average aggression score for aggressive (top part),
normal (bottom part), and all (middle part) users, based on 5 dif-
ferent types of users’ ordering, through the simulation time.
in real time in a network. By focusing on user interactions (Voter
model), or user’s internal aggression state (Deffuant_P, HK_0.5_P,
and HK_1.0_P), the aforementioned models can be used to track
how aggression propagates in networks with similar properties.
5.3 Is the order of changes important?
Figure 3 shows the aggression evolution of three sets of users (i.e.,
normal, aggressive, all users) in relation to how they could interact
(i.e., randomly, based on popularity (most/least), involved neighbor-
hood, and network id), for the top two models (similar results for
all top models, omitted due to space). If aggressive users were to
interact randomly, it would lead to faster decline of the aggression
compared to the rest of the ordering methods. In contrast, aggres-
sive users show greater resistance in reducing their aggression
if they were to interact based on users’ popularity (from highest
to lower). Interestingly, assuming the least popular users were to
interact (act on their aggression) first, it would lead to slower prop-
agation. If aggression propagated from one neighborhood to the
next, it would also lead to a slow rate of propagation, at times
approaching the least popular user ordering. For normal users, ag-
gression status could not be significantly affected by the way they
interact; the difference between the initial and final aggression
scores is subtle. Instead, the effect of normal users is greater on the
aggressors than the inverse. For all considered models (apart from
Voter) after a number of interactions (i.e., 175k), the aggression
score converges, indicating that within a network, even with faster
or slower changes, the network state stabilizes.
(a) Normal users (b) Aggressive users
Figure 4: CDFs of the final aggression scores of (a) normal and (b)
aggressive users who participated in the aggression propagation.
Takeaways. Overall, the way users could interact and “exchange”
or propagate aggression impacts the overall network state. Pop-
ularity of users can be a great predictor of how aggression will
move in the network. This could be attributed to the fact that more
popular users can have stronger impact within a network if they
are aggressive (or not) due to their high degree centrality, since
they can affect many users at the same time, leading to high rate
of aggression propagation. This is also aligned with phenomena
already evident in the wild (3rd insight: Influence due to power dif-
ference, Sec. 3.1). At the same time, normal users are more resistant
to aggression, due to their expected higher power status and larger
neighborhoods with non-aggressive state.
5.4 What is users’ final aggression state?
Figure 4 shows how users’ aggression has settled at the end of
the simulation (on 10th snapshot) across the top four performing
models; we consider the more realistic random ordering of changes.
Figure 4(a) shows that regardless of model, at least 60% of normal
users in the end remain unaffected (i.e., their aggression score is
zero), while at most 40% of users gain some aggression (at different
levels, varying from 0 to 1). For instance, based on Deffuant_P, al-
most 10% of users end up with maximum aggression score, with
the rest of users varying between the lower and upper limits. In
Voter, because of its formulation, the aggression score is either 0 or
1, with about 20% of normal users affected. Finally, from Figure 4(b),
about 20%-30% of aggressive users maintain their high aggression
score (depending on the model), with only about 30% of aggressive
users turning normal (Deffuant_P and HK_*_P). Contrary to normal
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users, whenVoter is used, a high portion of ∼ 80% aggressive users
is positively affected by turning into normal. Overall, in consis-
tency with Figure 3, normal users are more resistant to adopting
aggression, as opposed to aggressive users.
5.5 Validation of top models in prediction
We conclude this investigation by evaluating the performance of
the top four models in predicting the aggression status of users,
by testing the models on the ground truth dataset Crawled Net LT
(Table 1). However, this network is comprised of the 401 users’ ego-
networks, i.e., their friends and followers, but not their 2nd-hop
and beyond (we could not collect this information due to Twitter
limitations). To perform fair application of the models, we filtered
this graph and kept a subgraph that includes all ego users (out of
the 401) that have edges connecting them. In this way, all users
participating in the experiment have their ego-graphs crawled (i.e.,
i and j in the models). As shown in Table 1, this filtering resulted in
a subgraph of 314 users and 540 edges (Ego-Ego Net LT ). Then, we
kept the graph’s SCC and concluded with 57 nodes and 395 edges.
Due to its small size, we select all the edges of this graph for the
interaction (and not only a random 10% of them). This simulation
tests all the different types of users’ ordering (Sec. 4.4) and the best
four models: Voter, Deffuant_P, HK_0.50_P, and HK_1.0_P. Different
aggression thresholds TA = 0.05, . . . , 0.9 are used to characterize a
user as aggressive if his final state is greater than the threshold, and
normal otherwise. The goal of this experiment is to let the models
simulate propagation of aggression, thus altering users’ state. Then,
we measure their performance in predicting correctly which users
remained normal or aggressive and which changed, using standard
machine learning metrics such as Precision, Recall and AUC.
From Table 3, we observe that the best performance arises when
the interaction of users happens based on the increasing ranking of
their user IDs, indicating that account age (which is proxied by the
user ID) may have important influence in the propagation process.
We notice that Deffuant_P and HK_1.0_P achieve good performance
when low TA is used, such as 0.10-0.20, and the AUC score ranges
from 0.71 to 0.75. In addition, we experimented with executing the
models for a portion of the edges available. Using random users’
ordering, the HK_1.0_P model achieves AUC score, Precision and
Recall equal to 0.76, for TA=[0.05, 0.30], after 50 interactions. Also,
satisfactory validity was achieved for Deffuant_P method, when
50, 100, 200 and 250 interactions take place, in random order. We
observe that after 50 interactions, and while TA ranges from 0.05
to 0.30, the AUC score, Precision and Recall are equal to 0.79, 0.70
and 0.79, respectively.
Takeaways. Overall, with these validation experiments, we show
that our top performing models are capable of emulating reliably
the propagation of aggression, as validated on this small, anno-
tated Twitter dataset. In addition to the previous results, we find
that older accounts propagating first their aggression to newer ac-
counts matches better the ground truth data at hand. This hints
that account age may have important influence in the aggression
propagation process and renders some extended future work.
Table 3: Model performance at predicting which users will remain
(or change into) normal or aggressive. (Showing only results for
AUC ≥ 0.70, on Ego-Ego Net SCC LT ).
Model Order Threshold #edges AUC Precision Recall
Deffuant_P sorted 0.10 395 0.71 0.59 0.71
Deffuant_P sorted 0.20 395 0.74 0.60 0.74
HK_1.0_P sorted 0.10 395 0.72 0.60 0.72
HK_1.0_P sorted 0.20 395 0.75 0.60 0.75
HK_1.0_P random [0.05, 0.30] 50 0.76 0.76 0.76
Deffuant_P random [0.05, 0.30] 50 0.79 0.70 0.79
6 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
Despite the consequences that aggressive behavior has on individ-
uals (e.g., embarrassment, depression, isolation from other commu-
nity members, etc.), there are still important cases of aggression that
stay under the radar of social networks, e.g., [47]. In fact, how such
behavior propagates within networks and which network or other
factors affect this propagation, have not been extensively studied.
To address this gap, here, we are the first to propose a pipeline to
evaluate various aggression dynamics models, and to conclude in
those best emulating aggression propagation in social networks. To
simulate how such behavior could spread in the network, we built
on top of popular opinion dynamics models, and test and validate
our models’ performance on real Twitter data. We found that our
proposed models based on the Deffuant and Hegselmann & Krause
opinion models, perform best in modeling aggression propagation
in a network such as Twitter, regardless of parameters or thresholds
used. Important insights embedded in these models are: (1) online
aggression tends to propagate from one user to another, (2) power
score of a user (e.g., degree centrality) and (3) users’ internal aggres-
sion state, both constitute top factors to be considered in aggression
propagation modeling, (4) influence by users’ neighborhood is of
less importance than other factors.
Overall, we believe this work makes a significant first step to-
wards understanding andmodeling the dynamics of aggression. The
outcomes of our work highlight the suitability of the top performing
models in simulating propagation of aggression in a network such
as Twitter, and how a campaign tomonitor and even stop aggression
on Twitter could work. That is, if aggressive users are monitored in
their interactions with others (e.g., posting of aggressive messages),
and simultaneously, normal users are shielded from this aggression
by dropping such communication, the overall aggression in the
network will significantly drop. In fact, if the campaign targets
highly popular aggressive users, who are encouraged to reduce
their aggression via educational tutorials and other interventions,
the overall aggression in the network can drop faster than select-
ing users with different criteria (e.g., random). Furthermore, we
found evidence that the age of an account may be influencing the
way aggression propagates. However, more in-depth investigation
on ground truth data with aggression propagation information is
needed to reveal clearer patterns of this aspect.
As first proposed by [52], and moving towards a better, more
global or unified model of aggression propagation, in the future,
we can consider aspects of this behavior in relation to social media
activity, such as the actual content of a post, the time it was posted,
which user posted it, which users commented on the post and
how long after the original post was done, the reaction of the
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neighborhood of the original poster and commenters, etc. Another
interesting extension of this work would be to attempt aggression
propagation modeling on a dynamic network, in which links are
added or removed through time, since evolving networks are the
most realistic but notoriously difficult to model. Also, it would be
worthwhile to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed models
to predict aggression on other online social network platforms.
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